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The Impact of Technology and Regulation on  
the Geographical Scope of Banking 
 
Abstract 
We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) 
geographical scope of banking.  We first review how both physical distance and the 
presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit 
availability) and market presence (branching and servicing).  Next we discuss how 
technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the 
European banking sector.  We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work 
and highlight open questions along the way. 
We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature:  (1) Bank 
lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing 
and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (2) Because of informational 
asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of 
entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically 
feasible; (3) Current technological and regulatory developments may to a large extent 
remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing 
frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe.  We conclude the paper by offering 
pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons. 
 
 
Keywords: geographical scope, banking, lending relationships, technology, and regulation. 
JEL: G21, L11, L14. I. INTRODUCTION 
Spectacular advances over the last decades in information processing and communication 
technology as well as continued deregulation of the financial marketplace on both sides of 
the Atlantic may have dramatically expanded the geographical reach of financial institutions 
and their clients.  Bankers, consultants, and financial journalists alike now envision a future 
world in which consumers and businesses seek and access bank services 24/7 (i.e., 24 hours 
a day, 7 days a week) from any physical location on the wired part of the planet. 
Yet (and notwithstanding all the hype) the daily grind of obtaining financing for most 
businesses still seems strikingly different from a world where “distance is about to die”.  
For example, the median small US business reports in the 1998 National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF) that it is located a mere 8 kilometres (5 miles) away from its 
lending bank (though it should be noted that this distance has been increasing steadily over 
the last decades).  In addition, small businesses in the US still communicate predominantly 
in person with their lending bank (Petersen and Rajan (2002)). 
European small firms are possibly located even closer to their lenders.  For example in 
Degryse and Ongena (2004) we document how the median entrepreneur borrowing from a 
large Belgian bank in 1997 travelled only 2 ¼ kilometres (1.4 miles) to the bank branch 
granting the credit.  This very short distance has actually increased by only 30 meters (0.02 
miles) per year over the last three decades.  Other work has also highlighted the lack of 
integration of (European) retail banking markets.  Different measures of integration show 
that retail banking markets are not (yet) integrated in Europe (Baele, Ferrando, Hordahl, 
Krylova and Monnet (2004)), in contrast to for example corporate bond and equity markets 
that have integrated rapidly since the early 1990s. 
Why is proximity to a bank branch still very important for most borrowing European small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)?  And how does geography affect lending conditions 
and the structure and operation of European retail banking markets?  Will technological 
developments and regulations shape and alter this impact?  Will distance only “die another 
day” in European retail banking markets? 
We summarize answers given to these questions by recent banking research.  Reviewing 
contemporary contributions naturally leads us to highlight open issues and pinpoint 
unanswered questions.  We also provide some recommendations with respect to 
competition policy in banking and banking supervision towards the end of the paper. 
We start by distinguishing between distance and borders.  While intimately related, these 
concepts are often usefully separable when assessing the geographical scope of financial 
markets.
1  Distance pertains to physical proximity that can be bridged by traditional modes 
of transportation, say car or train travel.  In other words, by spending some distance-related 
costs banks or their clients can overcome the distance and engage in transactions with one 
another.  For given locations of banks and borrowers, distance per se is exogenous and 
bridging it (i.e., the lender visiting the borrower and/or the borrower visiting the lender) 
may be adequate to deal with informational problems for the lender concerning its decision 
about granting and pricing the loan.  As a result, given location, banks play no (or a rather 
mechanical) role in theoretical competition models featuring only distance. 
Borders, on the other hand, are not merely bridgeable by car or train travel, or even more 




regulation or endogenously arise through the actions of the competing lenders.  We think of 
borders as being tightly interrelated with informational problems that cannot be easily 
resolved or ameliorated by technological developments.  The national borders of the 
countries in Europe often coincide with the cultural, informational, and/or regulatory 
borders that are relevant in this respect (we classify and discuss borders in Section II). 
Bank lending to small firms in Europe, we contend in this review, remains confined by both 
distance and borders (Figure 1).  In contrast, large multinationals issue corporate bonds on a 
pan-European market anchored in London, Frankfurt, or Luxembourg.  In the corporate 
bond market neither distance nor borders are relevant any longer.  The same can probably 
be said about European investment / wholesale banking and interestingly enough also about 
venture capital markets as documented by Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh (2004) (for simplicity 
reasons we did not include all these markets in Figure 1).  Consumer credit cards are an 
interesting intermediate case.  In quite a few European countries banks compete nation-
wide to enlist credit card users; distance plays no role anymore.  However no banks we 
know of target yet credit card customers across national borders. 
Why do we observe this remarkable diversity in geographical scope of financial and 
banking markets in Europe?  Part of the explanation may reside in the different 
informational requirements in each of these markets.  Small and young businesses often 
lack publicly accessible accounting statements, an observable repayment track record, or 
assets that can serve as acceptable collateral (called “hard” information in Petersen (2002) 
and Stein (2002)).  Hence the assessment by the lending bank’s loan officer of the skills and 
character of the firm’s management and the quality of the firm’s business vision (called 
“soft” information) will play a key role in the lending decision.  “Handshakes”, in situ 
monitoring, and repeated interaction will create trust in the borrowing firm and foster a 
bank-firm relationship, but may require physical proximity to be economically viable. 
In contrast, corporate bond issuers are mostly large and well-known international firms that 
can easily be assessed by many investors and banks located across Europe on the basis of 
accounting statements and public track record.  Hence corporate bond markets integrated 
rather rapidly as regulatory impediments dissolved and a common currency was introduced.  
Credit cards are intermediate in this regard.  Consumers can be readily scored on the basis 
of observable characteristics such as age, income, and marital status and card balances can 
be pooled and securitized, making distance within each country increasingly irrelevant.  
However consumer characteristics, preferences, and regulatory protection still differs 
substantially across European countries making cross-border bank forays more complex. 
What are the consequences of a geographical scope determined by both distance and 
borders for the conditions and structure in the retail banking markets in Europe?  
Previewing the main lessons we draw in this paper, recent work suggests that: 
(1) Bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) 
spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; 
(2) Because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and 
acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-
border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; 




impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing 
frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section II reviews the theoretical predictions 
and empirical findings regarding the geographical scope of banking.  Section III discusses 
the impact of technology and regulation on the geographical scope while Section IV 
assesses the current state of the banking sector in the Europe.  Section V provides some 
policy recommendations and concludes. 
II. GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF BANKING 
(i) Distance versus Borders 
To structure our analysis, we commence by distinguishing between lending conditions and 
market presence as the first dimension and between distance and borders as the second 
dimension. These divisions yield a four-celled matrix as in Figure 2.  We aim to position 
the relevant theoretical contributions and empirical findings in the banking literature in one 
of these four cells.  Lending conditions naturally concern the offering, pricing and rationing 
of loans, while market presence relates to the location and characteristics of bank branches. 
We already introduced our distinction between distance and borders in the Introduction 
(Section I).  We further follow Buch (2002) in distinguishing between “regulatory” and 
“economic” borders.  Regulatory borders may simply prohibit “foreign” banks from 
engaging borrowers, setting up branches, and/or acquiring local banks.  However the 
Riegle-Neal Act and Second European Banking Directive in effect removed most if not all 
such Regulatory Borders in the United States and Europe, respectively.  Most economic 
borders however remain unaffected by these specific Directives.  Take the existing 
exogenous economic borders such as legal origin and system, supervisory and corporate 
governance practices, political framework, language or cultural differences.  We will argue 
in more detail in Section IV that these borders, in Europe in particular, remain in place and 
have been almost unaffected by either technological developments or deregulation. 
Endogenous economic borders on the other hand are mainly informational and may well be 
affected by technological developments and deregulation but the extent to which remains 
unclear.  Informational borders arise because of the formation of bank-firm relationships, 
adverse selection, or information sharing between (a group of) banks.  Take the formation 
of a bank-firm relationship.  Banks learn about borrowers by privately observing repayment 
of earlier loans or observing borrower’ type (Sharpe (1990)).  It is this informational 
asymmetry between the ' inside'  bank and other ' outside'  banks, which gives the inside bank 
a competitive edge and almost assures continued interaction, i.e., the existence of a 
relationship, between the bank and its high-quality borrowers.  Inside banks make 
economic rents while outside banks succeed occasionally in “poaching” mostly low-quality 
borrowers and at best break even (Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004)), in the absence of 
other frictions.  Hence, relationships arise as an endogenous barrier to entry limiting the 
number of incumbent inside banks operating in a market (Dell' Ariccia (2001)). 
Banks are also faced with adverse selection.  De novo or “foreign” banks screening a 




incumbent local banks will continue to engage the best customers (Broecker (1990), Shaffer 
(1998)).  The entrants can be expected to end up “fishing in a pretty bad pool”.  The 
harshness of the adverse selection problem faced by the new banks depends on, for 
example, the banking structure (e.g. number of incumbent banks), the correlation in 
outcomes of the screening processes by new and incumbent banks, and the investment in 
screening accurateness made by the incumbents (Gehrig (1998)). 
Information sharing between banks, when accessible by outside banks, may lower this 
endogenous barrier of pre-existing bank-firm relationships.  Indeed, the information 
dissipated through the information sharing network decreases the inside bank’s 
informational advantage (Padilla and Pagano (1997)), reducing the informational lock-in.  
Initiatives to start the cross-border sharing of information in Europe may lower the 
informational economic border.  On the other hand information sharing also serves as a 
collusive device allowing banks to coordinate and be used as a strategic device to soften 
competition, as it introduces non-information related switching costs (Gehrig and 
Stenbacka (2001), Bouckaert and Degryse (2004)).  If coordination can take place and 
remain (somewhat) exclusive, information sharing between incumbent banks constitutes 
another endogenous economic border outside banks need to overcome to enter a market. 
Alternatively, information sharing introduces other economic borders as switching costs. 
(ii) Distance and Lending Conditions: Spatial Pricing 
Recent theoretical papers highlight the importance of distance in explaining the availability 
and pricing of bank loans (the Northwest cell “Distance / Lending Conditions” in Figure 2).  
As suggested by a number of theories, lending conditions depend on the distance between 
the borrower and the lender, and the distance between the borrower and the closest 
competing bank.  We borrow from Degryse and Ongena (2004) in our discussion of spatial 
pricing in this section and return to spatial rationing in Section (iii).  Table 1 summarizes 
the theoretical predictions regarding spatial pricing. 
Transportation Costs for Borrowers 
In location differentiation models (Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)), borrowers incur 
distance-related transportation costs in the action of visiting a bank.  Banks necessarily have 
to price uniformly if they cannot observe borrower location,
2 or are prevented from 
charging different prices to different borrowers.  Borrowers pay the same interest rate, but 
the total transportation costs incurred differ, depending on the firm’s location vis-à-vis the 
lending bank. 
However, if banks observe the borrowers’ location and offer interest rates based on that 
information, they can engage in spatial price discrimination.  Banks are often informed 
about the borrower’s address before even granting or pricing a loan.  If borrowers pay for 
their own transportation, as is mostly likely to be the case, a bank optimally charges a 
higher interest rate to those borrowers that are located closest to its bank branch (Lederer 
and Hurter (1986)).  The reasoning is that closer borrowers face higher total transportation 
costs when visiting competing banks (which are located further away than the lending 
bank), resulting in some market power for the lender over closer borrowers.  Similarly, a 
monopolist bank optimally charges a higher loan rate to close borrowers, as these borrowers 




Monitoring Costs for Lenders 
The cost of monitoring a borrower could also be related to physical distance.  Total 
monitoring costs increase with borrower-lender distance, because of extra communication 
costs or transportation costs incurred by banks visiting the borrowers’ premises.  Loan rates 
passing through such costs increase with distance.  However, distance-related monitoring 
costs might also allow for discriminatory pricing. 
In Sussman and Zeira (1995), banks face monitoring costs known to be increasing in 
distance.  As a result, lenders extract rents from close borrowers, because more distant 
competing banks take into account their own higher monitoring costs in their loan rate 
offers.  As indicated in Table 1, spatial price discrimination based on bank monitoring costs 
again implies a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-
lender (borrower-closest competing bank) distance (for a given number of banks). 
Distance and Lender Information 
The severity of the asymmetric information problem itself may also increase with distance.  
Hauswald and Marquez (2003a) for example develop a model in which the precision of the 
signal about a borrower’s quality received by a bank decreases with (informational) 
distance.  Because banks receive more precise signals about close borrowers in Hauswald 
and Marquez (2003a), competing banks face increasing adverse selection problems when 
approaching borrowers closer to the most informed bank.  Hence, the informed relationship 
bank can charge higher interest rates to closer borrowers, while the uninformed 
transactional banks charges higher interest rates to borrowers located farther away (due to 
the increase in the adverse selection problem).  Or to put it differently: the uninformed 
(transactional) lender charges a higher loan rate to remote borrowers in order to compensate 
for the adverse selection problem, which intensifies in the vicinity of an informed 
(relationship) lender.  The informed lender accordingly extracts a higher loan rate from 
closer borrowers.  Ceteris paribus, Hauswald and Marquez (2003a) derive a negative 
(positive) relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the 
relationship (transactional) bank.  We indicate this result again in Table 1. 
We note that the model developed by Hauswald and Marquez (2003a) in effect straddles 
our “Distance and Borders” categorization.  Their model also features “relationship 
borrowers”, whose current borrowing conditions may be determined by past and future 
borrowing.  The transportation and monitoring cost models discussed so far seem mostly 
relevant for “transactional borrowers”, whose current borrowing conditions are unaffected 
by past or future borrowing.  Recent work suggests both type of engagements may coexist 
in banking markets (Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas (2004), Degryse and Ongena (2003b)). 
Number of Banks 
In spatial models, the number of banks in the market is typically positively related to the 
magnitude of the transportation cost, and inversely related to the distance between the 
lender and the (closest) competing banks.  An increase in the number of banks (harsher 
competition) increases the likelihood of receiving a lower loan rate offer.  A decrease in the 
fixed set-up costs per bank (in, for example, Sussman and Zeira (1995)) increases the 




decreases the loan rate for each bank-borrower distance combination.
3 
On the other hand, an increase in the number of banks aggravates an adverse selection 
problem by enabling lower quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in moral hazard 
and credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan (1995)) or a higher interest rate (Broecker (1990)).  
In Dell’Ariccia (2001), adverse selection generates an endogenous fixed cost, constituting a 
barrier to entry in the industry limiting the number of competing banks even when markets 
become very large. 
Similarly, a decrease in the fixed-cost component of the relationship-building technology in 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003a) not only leads to an increase in the number of banks and 
more competition, but also results in a retrenchment towards relationship lending.  The 
lower entry barrier then leads to sharper adverse selection problems and higher loan rates 
for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender, but lower loan rates for customers 
farther away.  In effect, loan rates will decrease (increase) more per unit of distance 
between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank. 
Distance, Borrower Information, and Experience 
Casual observation suggests that borrowers do not always frequent the closest bank, as most 
spatial models dictate they should.  Incomplete borrower information and other bank 
product characteristics cause borrowers to visit more distant banks. 
First, borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise location of all competing 
banks and the availability and conditions of the loans offered there.  Grossman and Shapiro 
(1984) and Bester and Petrakis (1995) model such location cum informational 
differentiation.  In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), consumers buy a product from a 
particular seller upon becoming informed of its location through advertising.  The 
advertising itself is not localized.  The sales price in their model exceeds the full 
information price, by the magnitude of the transportation cost, as informational 
differentiation lowers the elasticity of demand.  In addition, consumers in their model, as 
they are unaware of all sellers, do not necessarily patronize the closest one.  Bester and 
Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower price offers.  In the absence of advertising, 
customers are only informed about “local” prices.  Producers will advertise lower prices to 
attract customers from more distant locations.  Hence, more distant informed customers 
will be observed to receive lower prices. 
Second, while borrowers often mention bank branch proximity as a major concern 
(Elliehausen and Wolken (1990), Binks and Ennew (1997)), location is obviously just one 
characteristic of a bank’s product that is important for its customers.  Hence, borrowers may 
not patronize the closest bank branch when another bank’s loan product exhibits other, 
more preferred, characteristics (Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002)).  And, once borrowers have 
experienced a good match and have observed the high-quality services provided by their 
current bank, they will switch to another bank only when offered a considerably lower price 
(Tirole (1988), p. 294). 
To conclude, most theoretical models imply a negative (positive) correspondence between 
the borrower-lender (competing bank) distance and the loan rate, caused by either 
transportation costs (for either the borrower or the lender) or asymmetric information.  




strength of the distance – loan rate relationship. 
Empirical Evidence on Spatial Pricing 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) are among the first to provide concrete evidence on the possible 
presence of spatial pricing in bank lending.  They find for example that a small business 
located one mile from the lending bank ceteris paribus pays around 38 basis points less 
than a borrower located around the corner from the lending bank.  In Degryse and Ongena 
(2004) we also include the distance to the closest competitors in the specifications.  Please 
notice that both papers include a variety of controls (and exercises to control) for firm risk 
to avoid picking up the spurious effects of spatial rationing on pricing. 
In Degryse and Ongena (2004) we find a somewhat smaller impact of physical distance on 
the loan rates than Petersen and Rajan (2002), but the impact we measure is still highly 
statistically significant and economically relevant.  The impact on the loan rate of both 
distance to the lender and distance to the closest competitor is actually similar in absolute 
magnitude, but of an appropriate opposite sign, which in itself is also evidence suggestive 
of spatial price discrimination.  For example, for small loans loan rates decrease 7 basis 
points per mile to the lender and similarly increase 7 basis points per mile to the closest 
(quartile) competitor.  We further deduce that, given current transportation costs and 
opportunity costs of travel, the average first-time borrower in our sample needs to visit the 
lender between two and three times to obtain a bank loan. 
Most studies find no impact of the number of competitors on the loan rate, while the 
magnitude of the impact of the concentration index varies widely (see the Appendix in 
Degryse and Ongena (2003a) for details).  However, it remains difficult to compare results 
across specifications, banking markets, periods, and HHI measures.  Concentration 
measures are alternatively based on loans, deposits, or branches, and vary widely (across 
studies) in geographical span (Morgan (2002)). 
Location Rents for Banks 
To conclude, spatial price discrimination caused by either (borrower) transportation costs, 
(lender) monitoring costs, or asymmetric information may explain the results in both 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2004).  Transportation cost provides 
the most consistent and comprehensive interpretation of all the results documented in 
Degryse and Ongena (2004).  Inferred changes in lending technology may make an 
interpretation of the results in Petersen and Rajan (2002) more difficult.  In Degryse and 
Ongena (2004) we run through a number of straightforward exercises but cannot find any 
trace of adverse selection increasing in the (admittedly short) distances to the uninformed 
lenders.  In either case, our results suggest that the distance to the closest competitors is 
important for competitive conditions and that the actual location of the bank branches may 
be relevant when assessing the intensity of competition. 
Our estimates in Degryse and Ongena (2004) also indicate that spatial price discrimination 
targeting borrowers located near the lending bank branch yields average bank rents of 
around 4% (with a maximum of 9%) of the bank’s marginal cost of funding.  Taken at face 
value, our findings substantiate an important source of rents accruing to financial 




customer switching costs (Klemperer (1995)), which are in credit markets often attributed 
to pervasive informational asymmetries or the endogenous economic borders discussed 
earlier (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004)).  Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), 
for example, provide the first estimates of switching costs faced by bank borrowers.  Their 
findings imply average annualized bank rents of roughly 4% of the banks’ marginal cost of 
funding.  In Degryse and Ongena (2004), the increase of the loan rate during the average 
bank-firm relationship points to annual “information rents” of less than 2% of the bank’s 
marginal cost of funding. 
(iii) Distance and Lending Conditions: Spatial Rationing 
Distance also affects the availability of credit.  Stein (2002), for example, models the 
organizational impact of the ease and speed at which different types of information can 
“travel” within an organization.  “Hard” information (for example, accounting numbers, 
financial ratios, etc.) can be passed on easily within the organization while “soft” 
information (for example, a character assessment or the degree of trust) is much harder to 
relay.  Hence, if the organization employs mostly soft information, a simple and flat 
hierarchical structure and local decision-making may be optimal. 
The type of information, hard or soft, that is needed and available to arrive at optimal 
lending decisions also translates into a correspondence between distance and credit 
rationing.  For example lines embedded in credit cards are extended solely on the basis of a 
quantitative analysis of hard and easily verifiable information (for example, age, profession, 
address, etc. of the applicant).  As a result credit cards are offered by mail and across large 
distances in the US (Ausubel (1991)). 
A lot of small business lending on the other hand is still “character” lending.  To screen 
successfully, loan officers need to interact with the borrower, establish trust, and be present 
in the local community.  The “soft” information collected in this way is much harder to 
frame and to convey to others within the organization.  As a result small (opaque) firms 
borrow from close, small banks (Petersen and Rajan (2002)), while large banks mainly lend 
to distant, large firms employing predominantly hard information in the loan decision 
(Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2004)).  Small firms then may be subject to 
credit rationing when seeking financing across larger distances. 
However, from an empirical point of view, the severity of the rationing of credit affecting 
small firms is not entirely clear.  For example, the results in Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
indicate that the effect is economically rather small in the US, while preliminary findings by 
Carling and Lundberg (2002) seemingly indicate the absence of distance related credit 
rationing in the Swedish banking sector.  Alternatively, results in Degryse and Ongena 
(2004) suggest that transportation costs that are fixed per loan (i.e., do not vary by loan 
size) may explain why larger loans are obtained across larger distances (mainly by larger 
firms). 
(iv) Distance and Market Presence: Branching and Servicing 
Only very few papers study the importance of distance in determining market presence, i.e., 
the branching and servicing within certain areas (the Northeast cell “Distance / Market 




distance between own branches influence bank branching decisions in Spain.  She finds that 
the number of own branches in a particular (sub) market has a positive (but small) effect on 
the further entry decision of the bank in that market.  Hence, her results suggest that branch 
expansion is partly affected by the proximity of other branches of the same bank. 
Results by Berger and DeYoung (2001) provide a partial explanation for these findings.  
Berger and DeYoung (2001) document how efficiency of bank branches slips somewhat as 
the distance between branch and headquarters of the bank increases.  Hence in order to 
guarantee consistency in servicing across bank branches, banks decide to branch out 
methodically across certain areas rather than to build isolated outposts. 
(v) Borders and Lending Conditions: Segmentation 
Next we turn to the impact of borders on lending conditions and market presence.  A recent 
literature has started to investigate how different types of borders shape lending conditions 
and result in segmentation of credit markets (the Southwest cell “Borders / Lending 
Conditions” in Figure 2). 
National borders that often coincide with many of the exogenous economic borders 
discussed earlier continue to play an important role across the world.  Recent work by 
Buch, Driscoll and Ostergaard (2003) for example suggests that national borders in Europe 
still hold back bank investments.  As a result, European banks “over”-invest domestically 
and it is in particular country-specific credit risk that does not seem fully reflected in the 
interbank rates (see also Baele, et al. (2004)). 
But other type of borders may also result in segmented credit markets.  Empirical evidence 
suggests that “outside” lenders often face difficulties (or hesitate) in extending credit to 
mainly small local firms (Shaffer (1998), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)).  This 
happens in particular when for example existing relationships between incumbent banks 
and borrowers are strong (Bergström, Engwall and Wallerstedt (1994)) or when the local 
judicial enforcement of creditor rights is poor (Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2003)).  In all 
these cases borders will lead to market segmentation and difficulties for cross-border 
outside banks to engage any local borrowers.  In effect this market segmentation highlights 
the importance for the outside banks to strive to build an actual physical presence in the 
targeted market. 
(vi) Borders and Market Presence 
Indeed, academics and bankers alike have long recognized borders as important factors in 
impelling bank entry and cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions (the Southeast cell 
“Borders / Market Presence” in Figure 2). 
Bank Entry 
An older literature going back to Goldberg and Saunders (1981) and Kindleberger (1983) 
assert that banks often pursue a “follow-the-customer” strategy when deciding upon cross-
border market entry.  However recent evidence casts some doubt on this “follow-the-
customer” strategy as the only game in town.  In particular banks entering the US market 
have not primarily a follow-the-home-country-customer motive or at least not persevere in 




apparently engage many local borrowers (Seth, Nolle and Mohanty (1998), Stanley, Roger 
and McManis (1993), Buch and Golder (2001)). 
However banks encounter many difficulties (in other countries than the US) in successfully 
pursuing a strategy of engaging local firms by cross-border entry through local branches.  
DeYoung and Nolle (1996) and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) for example 
document how most foreign bank affiliates are less efficient than domestic banks, the 
exceptions being the foreign affiliates of US banks in other countries and most foreign bank 
affiliates in for example Eastern Europe and South-America.  The latter affiliates are often 
financially sounder than the domestic banks (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2002)).  Why 
are most foreign bank affiliates less efficient than the local crowd?  A paper by Buch 
(2004b) documents the inefficiencies by foreign bank affiliates are mostly due to the 
presence of economic borders (language, culture, etc.) and do not seem driven by physical 
distance. 
But there is a second reason why banks shy away from following-the-customer, apart from 
the fear of getting stuck with inefficient branch outposts.  Findings by Berger, et al. (2003) 
suggest customers are not that interested in being followed!  Indeed, they find that foreign 
affiliates of multinational companies choose host nation banks for cash management 
services more often than home nation or third nation banks.  This result is consistent with 
so-called “concierge” benefits dominating “home cookin´” benefits.  This is a surprising 
finding given that these large multinationals might be expected to be prime targets for 
preferential treatment by their home nation banks.  On the other hand, the opening of a 
foreign affiliate is a good occasion for a firm to escape a hold-up problem at “home”.  In 
this way, the establishment of new plants or subsidiaries in foreign countries is an 
opportunity to add a new (foreign) bank relationship. 
Berger, et al. (2003) also find that bank reach (global versus local) is strongly associated 
with bank nationality.  For example, if a host nation bank is the choice of nationality, then 
the firm is much less likely to choose a global bank.  Finally, they also find that bank 
nationality and bank reach both vary significantly with the legal and financial development 
of the host nation.  For example, firms appear to be much less likely to choose a host nation 
bank and more likely to choose a global bank when operating in the former socialist nations 
of Eastern Europe. 
Berger, et al. (2003) conclude on the basis of this evidence that the extent of future bank 
globalization may be significantly limited as many corporations continue to prefer local or 
regional banks for at least some of their services.  Though, as pointed out by Dermine 
(2003), this conclusion is partly predicated on the continuing (and endogenous) absence of 
foreign direct investment and possibly more importantly cross-border mergers taking place. 
Frequency and Value of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
However, cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are still a relatively rare 
species in many parts of the world, though the number in the euro-area has steadily 
increased.  Hartmann, Maddaloni and Manganelli (2003), for example, document that in 
1995 61% of all mergers involved institutions in the same country and only 11% involved 
banks situated in two different countries of the euro area.  By 2002 the percentage domestic 




Pozzolo (2001) also demonstrate that cross-border bank M&As occur relative to within-
border M&As less frequently than cross-border M&As in other industries, ceteris paribus, 
while Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) show that cross-border bank M&As occur less 
frequently than domestic bank M&As.  And it is again economic borders,
4 not distance, that 
make cross-border bank M&As less likely (Buch and DeLong (2001)). 
Hence taken together these studies suggest that not only exogenous economic borders (that 
also affect other industries) but also endogenous economic borders specific to the banking 
industry (information asymmetries in assessing target bank portfolios) may make it hard to 
pull off a successful cross-border bank M&A. 
Bank managers are apparently aware of the difficulties awaiting them when engaging in a 
cross-border M&A and seem to refrain from undertaking many.  But also investors 
recognize the dangers.  A nice recent study by Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004) for 
example documents that the combined cumulative abnormal returns for stocks of bidder 
and target bank in cross-border bank M&As in Europe over the last few decades is actually 
zero or negative!  This finding stands in stark contrast with other industries where the 
combined CARs of cross-border M&As are typically found to be positive.  Hence investors 
seemingly evaluate cross-border bank M&As as destroying value.  Beitel, Schiereck and 
Wahrenburg (2004) results are quite similar to findings in DeLong (2001).  She reports that 
in the US only the combined CARs of geographically focused bank M&As are positive, 
although it is not entirely clear what factors are driving this empirical finding. 
Borders and Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions? 
The evidence presented so far is not clear whether it is exogenous or endogenous 
(informational) economic borders that create most problems in making a cross-border bank 
M&A possible and successful.  A recent paper by Campa and Hernando (2004) suggests 
exogenous borders play a role.  Their study shows that the combined CARs of M&As are 
typically lower in industries, such as banking, that until recently were under government 
control or are still or were most heavily regulated.  CARs of cross-border M&As in these 
industries are actually negative, evidence in line with Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg 
(2004).  One possible interpretation is that the (lingering) effects of regulation make for 
harder economic borders. 
However while such residual regulatory and “institutional reasons are undoubtedly 
important, strong economic forces may impede the unification of banking markets” 
(Rosengren (2003)).  Economic forces may explain why there has also been so little 
interstate merger activity in the US, despite very homogeneous banking markets.  Cost 
savings are often impossible in cross-border mergers.  In-market mergers however allow for 
a reduction in redundant branch networks, underwriting activities, and/or local monitoring 
of credits.  Anticipating such savings may allow an in-market (domestic) acquirer “to bid 
more” than any other out-of-market (foreign) acquirer “in the auction of the target assets”.  
More in general the promise of cost cutting and indirect labour shedding may allow 
domestic banks to gain an upper hand in any complex and politicised merger dance 
involving also foreign suitors.  In addition, acquiring an in-market competitor limits the 
number of entry points for any out-of-market competitors and may increase the in-market 




Bank industry observers sometimes also note that for example bank organization and 
corporate governance may be an area shaped in ways that hinders merger activity.  The 
mutual structure of dominant banks in France and Germany in particular (for example, 
Credit Agricole, Landesbanken) is often passed of as a major hurdle for these banks to 
initiate and pursue a successful M&A (Wrighton (2003)).  But exogenous economic borders 
may also make cross-border bank M&As result in complex holding structures (Dermine 
(2003)), i.e., cross-border consolidation in Europe functions through subsidiaries and not 
branches as is common in US cross-state banking.  Hence, it appears as if the so-called 
“single passport” of the European Second Banking Directive is not very much used.  
Subsidiary configurations possibly further complicate future M&A activity. 
Finally, the impact of endogenous (informational) economic borders on cross-border bank 
M&A activity is less researched.  It is possible that the domestic merger activity, we have 
observed until now in Europe, creating so-called “National Champions” is partly made 
possible by the existence of informational borders.  Outside banks seeking to acquire a local 
bank find it more difficult than incumbent banks to assess the value of the loan portfolio of 
the possible target banks.  As a result of the winner’s curse problem, outside banks refrain 
from stepping in and most M&A activity, driven by for example (revenue and cost) scale 
and scope considerations, occurs between domestic banks. 
However as the domestic banks increase in size, diversify,
5 and possibly partly refocus their 
lending towards larger firms they become easier-to-value targets.  If this is indeed the case 
we contend that the informational asymmetries facing the outside acquiring banks may 
actually endogenously decrease over time as possible target banks that are shielded within 
the bordered area prosper, grow and merge among themselves resulting in a further 
diversification of their loan portfolios.  National competition policy concerns may 
ultimately hinder further domestic consolidation.  As further local mergers may be under 
scrutiny of competition policy authorities, winner’s curse problems may further decrease, 
facilitating cross-border M&As.  Hence one could argue that informational borders and the 
accompanying winner’s curse problem have a tendency to partly and endogenously self-
destruct, that M&As may become the optimal route of entering a market long before cross-
border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible, and that “National Champions” 
will almost inevitably metamorphose into “European Champions”. 
A natural question is then how borrowers will be affected by cross-border bank M&As.  It 
is possible that “in the first round” small local firms serviced by domestic target banks 
suffer somewhat as with domestic mergers (Sapienza (2002), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi 
(2002)).  Eventually niche banks may arise taking over part of the foreclosed lending 
activities (Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998)).  But technological developments 
and regulation undoubtedly will also play a role.  That is the topic of the next section. 
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION ON THE 
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF BANKING 
We argued so far (in section II) that the impact of distance on loan rates seems 
considerable, that the impact on credit rationing is currently unclear, and that the impact on 
bank branching and servicing is seemingly minor.  We have also discussed how the impact 




to the second question broached in this paper, which is how technology and regulations may 
shape the correspondence between distance and borders on the one hand and lending and 
market presence on the other. 
(i) Technology and Distance 
Berger (2003) investigates how advances in technology, in particular in communication and 
information processing, substantially alter current practices in the banking sector.  He 
argues that recent technological developments reduce “distance-related diseconomies”, in 
particular in four areas: (1) the monitoring and risk management of loans, (2) the offering of 
traditional banking services, through for example improvements in credit scoring, (3) the 
management of staff, and (4) the provision of new services over the internet.  Hence Berger 
in effect argues that technological developments will change the impact of distance on both 
lending conditions and bank market presence. 
However advances in communication technology and increased capacity for information 
need not imply more exchange of information at different levels.  First, take information 
exchange inside the banks.  Wilhelm (2001) for example argues that loan officers have 
limited incentives to transfer information, as they are the content originators but also the 
monopolists in the human capital needed to create proper credit assessments.  Hence loan 
officers may try to tie the now commodity-like distribution (sending reports by email) to its 
origination.  They can do so by arguing some information cannot be hardened or is too 
sensitive to move through the bank (or branch) organization. 
In addition, loan officers may initially be uncertain about the value added by the new 
technologies and may therefore be unaware of its desirability.  Recent work in game theory 
shows that both adoption and non-adoption of new technology are potential equilibria, 
leaving an important role for coordination in equilibrium selection.  Pre-play 
communication or cheap talk may help to choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and 
solve the coordination problem.  Myatt, Shin and Wallace (2002) show that adoption not 
only hinges on the expected value added by the new technology, but also on both the 
“fundamental uncertainty” – uncertainty concerning the value added – and the “strategic 
uncertainty” – uncertainty concerning the actions of others.  The interaction of these two 
types of uncertainty determines the strategy selected by the individual players and hence the 
actual adoption of the new technology. 
The advances in communication technology and increased capacity for information need 
also not imply more exchange of information between firms and banks.  For example, 
Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) have argued that firms choose the type 
and the number of financiers on the basis of concerns for confidentiality vis-à-vis product 
market competitors regarding proprietary information (R&D results, etc.).  Similar concerns 
refrain firms from giving the chosen financier(s) more specific information or limit the 
format in which the information is transferred (for example firms prefer to provide oral 
presentations rather than supply full-fledged project manuals; improved communication 
technology has not altered this desire). 
Finally, technological developments not necessarily enhance sharing of information 
between banks.  While technological progress shapes the structure of the information 




of information sharing or incentives to share information may remain unaffected.  Concerns 
about free-riding between banks and adverse selection and moral hazard at the firm level 
have long been recognized as a driver of the determination of the optimal degree of 
information sharing.  Even dramatically lower costs of information sharing may not alter 
such fundamental strategic calculations (Padilla and Pagano (1997), Bouckaert and Degryse 
(2004)).  Similarly, Vercammen (1995) for example argues that it is optimal for information 
sharing bureaus to limit the number of years of credit history that is maintained in the 
database.  Not for technological reasons (for example the cost of data storage) but because 
the incentive of the borrowers for compliance is reduced as credit histories lengthen and the 
value of a negative piece of information is reduced.  And indeed in all European countries 
surveyed by Jappelli and Pagano (2003) the public credit register eventually “forgets” 
though the precise memory system varies from country to country.  Again, it seems unlikely 
that technological developments will alter these specific trade-offs. 
(ii) The Impact of Technology on Spatial Pricing 
Nevertheless technology may have an impact on spatial pricing of deposits and loans.  For 
example, on-line banking spurs competition and alters the impact of distance on deposit 
rates (Bouckaert and Degryse (1995)).  Vesala (2000) for example shows that loan mark-
ups were decreasing substantially in recent years in Finland, in lock step with the rapid 
development of internet and mobile banking in that country.  On the other hand, Corvoisier 
and Gropp (2001) find only a small increase in contestability in European loan markets in 
recent years despite technological advances in many countries and despite an increase in 
contestability in deposit markets. 
A paper by Hauswald and Marquez (2003b) offers an explanation for these differential 
findings, providing yet another take on how technology need not lead to more exchange of 
information and competition.  In their model better access to information by banks leads to 
more competition and lower loan rates, but the improved ability by banks to process 
information actually leads to higher loan rates and higher bank profits as banks are better 
able to “carve out a niche” and generate informational rents. 
(iii) The Impact of Technology on Spatial Rationing 
The impact of technology on spatial rationing is equally unclear.  First, note that 
technological developments may increase competition from capital markets as individual 
investors can more cheaply obtain and process information.  Increased capital market 
competition pushes the natural habitat of bank financing towards more opaque firms, as 
depicted in Figure 3 (Berger and Udell (1993), Greenbaum and Emmons (1998), Mannonen 
(2001)).  However increased capital market competition also leads for example to changes 
in bank orientation away from relationship banking towards more transactional banking and 
more bank industry specialization (Boot and Thakor (2000)).  In contrast, they argue that 
more interbank competition leads to more relationship lending.
6  Hence, Boot and Thakor 
distinguish between two sources of competition, i.e., capital market competition and 
interbank competition, and they allow banks to choose between relationship lending and 
transactional lending.  In their model stiffer capital market competition reduces relationship 
lending, while interbank competition actually increases the relative amount of relationship 




Relationship lending then allows extracting higher rents from the borrower.  Fiercer 
interbank competition pushes banks into offering more relationship lending, as this activity 
permits banks to shield their rents better.  Any reorientation in Boot and Thakor (2000) 
alters both financing habitats and informational needs of the banks and possibly affects the 
impact of technology on the availability of credit. 
Controlling for firm and lender characteristics, Petersen and Rajan (2002) estimate a rather 
substantial increase in the (predicted) distance between lender and borrowing firms in the 
US over the last decades, from around 11 miles in 1973 to around 18 miles in 1991 (their 
Figure 3).
7  Petersen and Rajan (2002) also find that the modes of communication between 
lender and borrowers have become more impersonal over time.  In contrast, firms in 
Belgium “moved away” from their bank by only 0.02 miles per year in the period 1973 to 
1997 (Degryse and Ongena (2004)).  Differences in technological development seem 
unlikely to be the only explanation for this divergent growth rate in lender – borrower 
distance in the US and Europe, as the divergence started early in the 70s and seem to have 
continued to this day. 
(iv) The Impact of Technology on Branching and Servicing 
The impact of technology on bank branching and servicing may be equally muted.  Berger 
and DeYoung (2001) for example assert that technological developments only partially 
mitigate the negative effects of distance on efficiency.  But then remember that the effects 
were relatively mild to start with.  In addition, Cabral (2002) points out that the so-called 
“multi-channel” route in banking has now established itself as the standard in many 
countries.  Bank customers access bank services through ATMs, telephone, internet, and 
through personal contact in the bank branch itself! 
Hence branch proximity continues to play a non-negligible role in determining bank choice, 
muting the impact technological developments may have.  There is even reason to believe 
bankers and industry watchers for a while have underestimated the importance for 
customers of bank branch proximity. 
“The hot news in banking: bricks and mortar. Customers prefer 
branches so banks are opening ’em like crazy”, 
headlined an article on April 21
st, 2003 in Business Week (Gogoi (2003)) suggesting that 
de-branching may have gone too far and that incumbent or de novo banks are correcting 
these recent mistakes.  In addition, banks have incentives not to cut back on branches too 
much in order to keep potential entrants out of their incumbent markets.  
To conclude, the impact of technological advances may be limited to abating somewhat the 
impact of distance on the pricing and availability of loans and market presence.  There is 
still only limited evidence that advances in technology completely removed “the tyranny of 
distance”; in particular in Europe “distance still rules” as before. 
(v) Regulation and Borders 
The impact of changes in regulation both in the US and Europe have been substantial and 
profound.  Nevertheless retail loan markets in Europe remain surprisingly segmented, in 




von Thadden (2001), Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula and Pagano (2002)).  In addition, 
the distance at which banks lend internationally in Europe, and hence cross border, has not 
at all increased over time in Europe in contrast to the US where the distance at which banks 
lend internationally has steadily increased (Buch (2004a)). 
IV. STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(i) Exogenous Economic Borders 
What does this all mean for European banking?  Most regulatory borders are, as already 
noted, removed and in principle the European banking market should be open for business 
for all banks chartered in the European Union and provided with the single passport of the 
European Second Banking Directive.  In practice things are not that simple, as both 
exogenous and endogenous economic borders remain formidable barriers. 
Take differences in legal systems and practices.  Europe contains within its national 
boundaries all the (former) standard bearers from all major legal regimes, creating work for 
corporate lawyers but headaches and costs for bank management.  Another example: the 
variation in banking supervisory practices within the European Union is as large as the 
variation in the World (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)).  Needless to say it is close to zero 
within the United States.  Differences in corporate governance and the mutual structure of a 
few key banks in Europe create further barriers to integration. 
And then we haven’t touched yet upon the undeniably profound differences in politics, 
language, and culture within the European Union.  Is there any other common market on 
earth where people from its various places and corners are for example so specialized in 
very different sports with assorted Olympic medals and world titles to show for: just think 
about the Norwegians in cross-country skiing, the Dutch in ice-skating, and the Flemish in 
cyclo-crossing.
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(ii) Endogenous Economic Borders 
Endogenous (informational) economic borders also remain quite high in Europe.  As 
pointed out before, the impact of technology on informational borders is unclear a priori 
from a theoretical point of view.  But Europe further faces specific problems when it comes 
to reducing informational asymmetries.  Hardening of information for example could in 
principle alleviate some of the informational asymmetries.  But hardening of information 
may also be more problematic in Europe than in the US as it is not clear that all information 
that is already hardened is equally reliable across Europe.  For example, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) report a Rating on Accounting Standards that ranges 
between 36 and 83 for countries in Europe and between 24 and 76 for the rest of the world 
(the US score equals 71 while the average for all countries is 61).  In addition a lot of local 
knowledge is often still needed to correctly interpret the “hard facts” often involving 
translating “hard information” into “soft information”. 
Technological developments may bring an outcome.  But the introduction of new lending 
technology seems rather slow in most parts of Europe.  Various factors such as the small 
distances, a lower GDP/capita, centralized decision-making, a wait-and-see attitude, and 




seems needed to identify the true culprits. 
(iii) Distance Dies Another Day 
To conclude, borders (and as a result also distance) “may die another day” in Europe.  We 
would argue that as most lending occurs over shorter physical distances in Europe, 
informational asymmetries increasing in distance might not be an important issue.  Hence 
lending practices on the ground may be driven more by transportation technology than by 
changes in communication and information processing technology. 
However information asymmetries increase dramatically when crossing a border.  In this 
regard one could argue that the various exogenous and endogenous economic borders are 
mutually reinforcing and also that current technological and regulatory developments 
remain to large extent impotent in dismantling these formidable barriers. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our review of the academic banking literature highlights that retail banking markets remain 
to a large extent local: pricing and availability of credit hinges on local market conditions. 
We pointed at a number of exogenous and endogenous market imperfections that 
persistently make retail-banking markets “less competitive” than in the absence of these 
imperfections. The most recent deregulatory steps and the recent technological 
developments will most likely not remove the remaining exogenous and endogenous 
economic borders. Our policy recommendations are straightforward and withstood the test 
of time in terms having been recommended frequently.  That doesn’t make them any less 
relevant. 
To the extent that the rush towards building “National Champions” was the result of a 
winner’s curse problem, the trend may have run its course (Danthine, Giavazzi and von 
Thadden (2001)).  It is therefore time that the National Champions start naturally spilling 
across borders as well. We should note however that (1) cost savings are often impossible 
in cross-border mergers and (2) current cross-border mergers have produced negative 
combined cumulative abnormal returns.  To facilitate cross-border M&As further national 
supervisors need to treat domestic and cross-border merger candidacies more equally. 
Indeed, in a few high profile cross-border M&A attempts that took place in Europe, 
national supervisors wielded their informal and/or formal mandate in the bank merger 
review process to derail or maim the planned cross-border bank merger.  The role of 
banking supervisors in the merger review process is a natural and undisputable proper 
corollary to (1) its licensing mandate (capital requirements, “fit and proper management”, 
etc.), (2) its role in the bank default or restructuring process, and (3) its general engagement 
and responsibility for the maintenance of banking sector stability (Carletti and Hartmann 
(2003)).  However, it appears as if in a number of these recent instances national banking 
supervisors were mobilized or swayed by domestic political interests to block European 
cross-border bank mergers, fielding arguments of improper management or financial 
instability as only the flimsiest of excuses.  Further pressure from the European executive 
branch and judicial system, and enhanced national supervisory independence should put a 




In tandem with national bank supervisors, national and European competition authorities 
should pursue a pro-active competition policy and cut large financial institutions seeking 
yet another domestic partner no slack.  In addition, there may be a need for the foreseeable 
future for flexibility in allowing various organizational and corporate governance structures 
to co-exist.  The recently implemented European Company Statute should improve the 
situation on the ground in this regard.  On the other hand, and admittedly somewhat 
contradictory, questions may have to be raised about the further fostering (allowing) of 
mutual structures in banks.  Finally, possibilities for active pan-European take-overs need 
ultimately to be created (not only in banking obviously), such that the best combinations of 
banks can be determined by market participants and not by politicians.   
It is not clear the current supervisory framework is ready to handle National Champions 
growing into pan-European banking behemoths.  It may be fruitful to consider to rapidly 
reinforcing the existing web of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding with multilateral 
Memoranda agreed upon in one or more rounds of negotiation between national 
supervisors.  Multilateral work if successful may ultimately be more efficient in achieving 
the supervisory objectives.  In addition, serious consideration may have to be given to the 
creation of a European Bank Supervisor to which supervision and authority pan-European 
banks can choose to subject themselves to.  The newly established Lamfalussy Committees 
in Banking constitute major steps forward on all of these accounts.  In any case, more 
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Theoretical Models Linking Loan Rates and Distance 
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Competitor
*  Number of Competitors 
       
Transportation Costs (for Borrower)       
Uniform Pricing  No  no  negative 
Discriminatory Pricing  negative  positive  negative 
       
Monitoring Costs (for Lender)       
Marginal Cost Pricing  positive  negative  negative 
Discriminatory Pricing  negative  positive  negative 
       
       
  Distance to the Relationship 
Bank
* 
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Bank
*  Number of Competitors 
       
Asymmetric Information       
Dell’Ariccia (2001)  negative  no  negative 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003a)  negative  positive  positive / negative 
       
Source: Degryse and Ongena (2004).  Notes.  






1 Recent empirical work on the geographical scope of banking by, for example, Berger and 
DeYoung (2001), Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003), and Buch (2004b) include 
measures for both physical distance and cultural, informational, and/or regulatory borders 
in their specifications.  Studies by, for example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) on the 
portfolio choices of Finnish investors and Portes and Rey (2004) on international capital 
flows also include both distance and border variables. 
2 Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location of the borrower.  For example, if 
the borrower is an independent salesman or software consultant and maintains multiple 
centers of activity, it is not clear at first for the bank where to monitor.  In that case, the 
bank can engage in discriminatory pricing only upon becoming informed about the location 
and transportation costs faced by their borrowers.  In Dell’Ariccia (2001), banks become 
informed about the location of the borrower through first-period lending.  In his model, only 
"relationship" banks, lending to the same firm for a second time, can engage in spatial price 
discrimination, while de novo "transactional" banks have to resort to “mill pricing”. 
3 An increase in the number of banks also decreases the loan rate in more general models of 
imperfect Cournot competition between a finite number of banks.  See, for example, the 
rendition of the Monti (1972)-Klein (1971) model in Freixas and Rochet (1997) (pp. 57-
60). 
4 Regulatory borders explicitly prohibiting bank M&As have been removed in Europe.  
However, national and political interests frequently result in the mobilization of the national 
anti-trust or banking safety apparatus to block cross-border bank M&As.  We acknowledge 
these actions resort somewhere in the gray area between explicit prohibition of cross-border 
bank M&As (regulatory borders) and inherent political and cultural differences creating 
difficulties in making a cross-border bank M&A possible and successful (economic 
borders). 
5 We conjecture the winner’s curse in von Thadden (2004) for example would decrease in 
case success across multiple projects undertaken by many borrowers would be uncorrelated. 
6 Degryse and Ongena (2003b) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) provide empirical evidence 
broadly supporting both hypotheses. 
7 The evidence for deposit markets seems to run in the same direction.  Heitfield and Prager 
(2004) for example document that the geographical scope of competition in US bank 
deposit markets is still smaller than statewide though not necessarily local any longer. 
8 Riding (or running with) a road bike on a mountain bike track full of mud and puddles is 
called cyclo-crossing.  
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